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International Technology Transfer
for Climate Policy
Introduction
While the developed world is starting to limit emissions of greenhouse
gases, emissions from the developing world are increasing as a result
of economic growth. Reducing these emissions while still enabling
developing countries to grow requires the use of new technologies. In
most cases, these technologies are first created in high-income countries.
Thus, the challenge for climate policy is to encourage the transfer of
these climate-friendly technologies to the developing world.
This policy brief reviews the economic literature on environmental
technology transfer. It then discuss the implications of this literature
for climate policy, focusing on the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. It concludes by asking whether the current
structure of the CDM provides sufficient incentives for technology
transfer. Are CDM projects providing real emissions reductions, or
are developed countries simply receiving credit for reductions that
developing countries could have achieved on their own? What lessons
can we learn from recent experience that may guide the development
of the CDM (or other similar policy tools) during the next round of
international climate policy negotiations?

Global Warming and the Kyoto Protocol
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are the gases present in the earth’s atmosphere
that reduce the loss of heat into outer space. Strong scientific evidence
indicates that excess GHGs trap heat and raise the temperature of the
earth’s atmosphere to a level that causes undesirable climate changes.
The most important greenhouse gases include water vapor, carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane, and ozone. While many natural processes
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produce GHGs, most scientists agree that anthropogenic (human)
activity, particularly burning carbon-based fossil fuels, has increased
the concentration of CO2 and some other GHGs since the Industrial
Revolution began in the mid-1700s. Although it is not easy to know
precisely how long it takes GHGs to leave the atmosphere, most take
several years.
The international response to climate change began at the Earth Summit
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where more than 150 countries signed the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change, a non-binding agreement to
stabilize GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.
Subsequently, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol set binding targets on 37
industrialized countries and the European Community to reduce
emissions 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. Since most
anthropogenic GHGs were created during the past 150 years of
industrial activity by developed countries, the Protocol placed a greater
responsibility on those countries to reduce GHG emissions. The Protocol
legally entered into force on February 16, 2005, and has been ratified by
180 countries to date.
The Kyoto Protocol provides three market-based “flexibility
mechanisms” to help countries meet their GHG emission targets.
•• Emissions Trading allows countries that have more emission units
than they need to sell the excess units (called assigned amount units, or
AAUs) to countries that are over their targets. A new commodity has
been created in the form of emission reductions or removals, known
simply as the carbon market. These transactions take place between
Annex I countries (developed and transitioning countries that have
ratified the Protocol; see Appendix for a list of Annex I countries).
•• Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) allows Annex I countries
with emission constraints to receive credit toward their own country’s
emissions reduction target by investing in projects that reduce emissions
in developing countries that do not face emission constraints. Developed
countries can thus reach their emission targets at a lower cost to
themselves by substituting emissions reduction projects in developing
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countries, where costs are lower, for more expensive projects in the home
country.
•• Joint Implementation (JI) enables any Annex I country to meet
its emissions reduction commitment by investing in a project in any
other Annex I country as an alternative to reducing emissions in their
own country. In practice, most JI projects are expected to take place in
transitioning Annex I countries, where costs are lower.
Recent rapid economic growth of countries such as China and India
brings the promise of a better life to much of the world’s population.
However, with growth comes pollution, particularly greenhouse gas
emissions such as carbon dioxide that lead to climate change. The need
to reduce global CO2 emissions comes at a time when the share of
emissions coming from developing countries is growing. From 2003
to 2004, CO2 emissions from developed countries that are members of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
grew by less than 2 percent, while those from non-OECD countries grew
by nearly 10 percent. Energy-related CO2 emissions from non-OECD
countries exceeded those from OECD countries for the first time in 2004
(Energy Information Administration 2007). Much of this increase can
be attributed to economic growth in China and India. In 1990, these two
countries accounted for 13 percent of world CO2 emissions. By 2004,
that figure had risen to 22 percent, and it is projected to rise to 31 percent
by 2030.
But CO2 persists in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, and developed
countries are responsible for nearly all of the increase in carbon
concentrations that has occurred since the Industrial Revolution. Through
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” the Kyoto
Protocol places the burden of reducing carbon emissions on those
countries responsible. Although the United States has not ratified the
Kyoto Protocol, other Annex I nations have, and plans to reduce CO2
emissions have been introduced in many of these countries.
During negotiations for the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, emissions
from developing countries will receive increased attention. Indeed, one
of the primary objections of US policymakers to Kyoto is the lack of
reduction commitments for developing countries. However, forcing
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mandatory emissions limits on developing countries will be difficult
because they also face internal pressures to develop and modernize their
economies and provide a higher standard of living for their citizens.
Burning fossil fuels, the main source of GHG emissions, increases as a
country’s economy grows.

Developing and Transferring New Technologies
Reducing GHG emissions while accommodating both economic growth
and population growth depends on one of two strategies (Holden 2006).
•• Reduce the carbon intensity of energy use (that is, the amount of
carbon emitted per unit of energy consumed). This ratio has been falling
over time, as the deployment of cleaner energy sources such as natural
gas and wind increases. However, this will be a particular challenge in
China, which currently receives about 68 percent of its energy from coal,
the most carbon intensive of the fossil fuels (Yardley and Revkin 2007).
•• Reduce energy intensity (energy usage per dollar of GDP) by
improving energy efficiency. More efficient technologies enable a
country to achieve greater economic output from a given amount of
energy.
Both strategies require developing new and improved technologies,
and then transferring them from developed to developing countries.
Most technological innovation currently takes place within a few highly
developed economies. In 2000, global research and development (R&D)
expenditures were at least $729 billion. More than 80 percent of this
R&D was conducted in the OECD, half by the United States and Japan
alone (National Science Board 2006). Thus, an important question for
policymakers as they negotiate a successor to Kyoto is how to encourage
the development and deployment of energy efficiency and alternative
energy technologies in the developing world.
Although the Kyoto Protocol does not impose binding emissions
reductions on developing countries, it offers the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) as a means by which developed nations can help
developing countries reduce their emissions. Under the Kyoto Protocol,
reducing GHG emissions (which are measured in millions of tons of CO2
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equivalent) by means of CDM projects has grown from just under 100
million tons in 2004 to nearly 550 million tons in 2007. As expected,
given the European Union’s active role in reducing CO2 emissions, most
of the investors are European countries, which sponsored 87 percent
of CDM and Joint Implementation projects, with Japan accounting for
another 11 percent (Capoor and Ambrosi, various years).
Technological Change and the Environment: Theory and Evidence
Technological change proceeds in three stages. At each stage, incentives
in the form of prices or regulations affect the development and adoption
of new technologies. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) described the process of
technological change as one of “creative destruction”:
•• Invention: an idea must be born.
•• Innovation: new ideas are then developed into commercially viable
products. Often, these two stages of technological change are lumped
together under the rubric of research and development (R&D).
•• Diffusion: to have an effect on the economy, individuals must choose
to make use of the innovation.
Market Failures in Research & Development
At all three stages, market forces provide insufficient incentives for
investment in either the development or diffusion of environmentallyfriendly technologies. Economists point to two market failures as the
explanations for underinvestment in environmental R&D.
One is the traditional problem of environmental externalities. Because
carbon emissions created in the production of a product are not normally
included in the price of the product, neither firms nor consumers have
any incentive to reduce emissions on their own. Thus, the market for
technologies that reduce emissions is limited, which in turn reduces the
incentives to develop such technologies. However, even in the absence
of policy interventions, there will likely be some incentives to develop
technologies that reduce carbon emissions. Such technologies may come
with private benefits—for example, reduced gasoline expenditures from
switching to a hybrid-powered automobile. The market failure problem
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simply means that individuals do not consider the social benefits of using
technologies that reduce emissions.
The second market failure pertaining to R&D is the public goods nature
of knowledge (see, for example, Geroski 1995). In most cases, new
technologies must be made available to the public for the inventor to
reap the rewards of invention. However, when this happens, some or all
of the knowledge embodied in the invention also becomes available to
the public. This public knowledge may lead to knowledge spillovers—
additional innovations, or even copies of the current innovations, which
provide benefits to the public as a whole but not to the innovator. As
a result, private firms do not have incentives to provide the socially
optimal level of research activity.
The technological innovations discussed in this brief will typically
include knowledge spillovers, as it is nearly impossible for the firm
transferring a technology to be fully compensated for the enhanced
productivity the recipient will enjoy when employing the newly-received
skills in future projects. Because firms cannot be fully compensated for
these knowledge spillovers, climate-friendly R&D will be underprovided
by market forces even if policies to correct the environmental
externalities of emissions, such as carbon taxes, are in place.
Current Findings for Environmentally-Friendly Innovation
•• Nearly all of the world’s R&D is performed in the developed
OECD economies, so their climate policies usually shape the
development of climate-friendly technologies.
Lanjouw and Mody (1996) study technological change for a variety of
environmentally-friendly technologies, using patent data from the US,
Japan, Germany, and 14 low- and middle-income countries. They find
that such innovation increases as pollution abatement expenditures in the
country increase. For the US, Japan, and Germany, the majority of these
patents are typically domestic patents. In contrast, for the developing
countries, the majority of these patents come from foreign countries.
This is especially true of air pollution control technologies, which are
typically complex. Water pollution control technologies, on the other
hand, are more frequently local innovations, as local conditions shape the
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requirements of these technologies, and they are less likely to be patented
elsewhere.
•• Policies in one nation may affect innovation of technologies in a
second nation.
For example, the United States was the first country to adopt strict
automobile emissions standards, but the majority of vehicle air emissions
patents granted in the US are from foreign nations (Lanjouw and Mody
1996). Korean automotive manufacturers first incorporated advanced
emission controls into their vehicles to satisfy regulatory requirements
in the US and Japanese markets (Medhi 2008), and only later did the
Korean government pass their own regulations requiring advanced
emission controls.
However, inventers of air pollution control technologies for coal-fired
electric power plants in the US, Japan, and Germany respond primarily to
domestic regulatory incentives (Popp 2006). In each country, the largest
increase in domestic patent applications occurs after the country passes
regulations affecting power plants. One reason why foreign markets may
have little influence on innovation in the electricity sector, as opposed
to the automotive industry, is that electricity is not a traded commodity.
Moreover, the bulk of emissions control equipment used in these
countries comes from domestic suppliers.
•• Adaptive R&D seems to be necessary to suit the technology to the
local market in developing countries.
Popp finds evidence of innovation even in countries that adopt
regulations late, suggesting that these countries do not simply take
advantage of technologies “off the shelf” that have been developed
elsewhere. Instead, late adopters often undertake adaptive R&D
to fit the technology to local markets. As evidence, Popp finds that
these later patents are more likely to cite earlier foreign rather than
domestic inventions. Lanjouw and Mody find similar evidence that
the environmentally friendly innovations that do occur in developing
countries are smaller inventive steps, typically done to modify existing
technologies to local conditions. Foreign knowledge serves as blueprints
for further improvements, rather than as a direct source of technology.
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When policymakers consider the potential for technological change
to reduce climate emissions in developing countries, they must make
allowances for adaptive R&D to fit technologies to local conditions,
or else be prepared for less than desired results when the transferred
technology is not a perfect fit for the local market.
•• Binding emissions constraints in developing countries will not be
necessary to encourage the invention and innovation of technologies
that reduce carbon emissions.
Policies in developed countries encourage innovation of emissionsreducing technologies. For example, patenting activity for renewable
energy technologies, measured by applications for renewable energy
patents submitted to the European Patent Office (EPO), has increased
dramatically in recent years, as both national policies and international
efforts to combat climate change begin to provide incentives for
innovation (Johnstone et al. 2008). Similarly, increased energy prices
that accompany a carbon tax or emissions trading scheme have led to
innovation in both energy efficiency and alternative energy sources (Popp
2002). As a result, technologies to help reduce emissions in developing
countries are available for adoption.

Transfer of Environmentally Friendly Technologies
As innovation of technologies to reduce GHGs is already underway
in developed countries, the key question for developing countries
is one of technology transfer. The current availability of cleaner
technologies offers developing countries a chance to leapfrog over
developed economies by adopting them before more serious harm
occurs (see Dasgupta et al. 2002). For instance, China’s 2006 Report
on the State of the Environment declares scientific innovation the key
to “historic transformation of environmental protection” and “leap-frog
development.” As an example of this, when China imposed their first fuel
economy regulations on passenger vehicles in 2004, the standards were
more stringent than those in place in the United States (Bradsher 2004).
However, as discussed below, it is still important for proper incentives to
be in place for these transfers to occur.
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What is Technology Transfer?
There is no one universally accepted definition of technology transfer.
Pertaining to climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) defines technology transfer as:
a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how,
experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting
to climate change amongst different stakeholders
such as governments, private sector entities, financial
institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and research/education institutions. (IPCC 2000, quoted
in Seres et al. 2007)
The benefits of the transfer to the recipient developing country, and
thus the potential for technology transfer to improve well-being in the
recipient country, depend on the type of transfer.
Embodied technology transfer comes through the importation of
equipment into a country (e.g., flows of equipment). In such cases, the
technology is embodied in the imported equipment.
Disembodied technology transfer involves the flow of know-how or
experience. Examples include demonstration projects, training local staff,
and local firms hiring away staff from multinational firms operating in a
developing country.
The benefits of each type of technology transfer are best illustrated by
the old Chinese proverb: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a
day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” The use of
advanced equipment imported into the country (embodied technology
transfer) may make the recipient country more productive, just as eating
fish received as a handout may make the recipient less hungry. However,
such transfers do not necessarily give the recipient country the ability
to replicate the technology on their own. In contrast, just as teaching
a man to fish enables the learner to provide for himself, disembodied
technology transfers enable the recipient to develop skills that can be
used in later projects initiated by the recipient country.
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At the same time, disembodied technology transfers are a concern
for private firms because they result in knowledge spillovers, or the
unintentional transmission of knowledge beyond the boundaries of the
firm. For instance, multinational corporations (MNCs) often go to great
lengths to keep local workers from leaving their firm to work for a local
company, in order to prevent knowledge from falling into a competitor’s
hands. These corporations often pay higher wages than local firms to
give workers an incentive to stay.
Sources of Technology Transfer
Public funding of technology transfer includes aid from governments or
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), typically in the form of official
developmental assistance (ODA). Compared to private investment,
ODA flows are small, but they are important in areas of the world
that receive little foreign investment (Gupta et al. 2007). In the case
of climate change, such aid often involves international cooperation.
For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and World Bank jointly
implement the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which provides
grants for developing country projects to protect the global environment.
Although not devoted specifically to climate change, biodiversity and
climate change are the two most important categories funded by GEF.
Since 1991, GEF has invested almost $2 billion for climate change, of
which 90 percent has gone to energy efficiency, renewable energy, GHG
reduction, or sustainable transportation (de Coninck et al. 2008).
Private firms transfer technology to developing countries in three ways.
Trade. A developing country may acquire new technology via
international trade, with the technology embodied in the good being
traded. Trade is an increasingly important source of new technologies;
the share of GDP attributed to imported high-tech products has grown
by over 50 percent in low-income countries, and by over 70 percent in
middle-income countries, since 1994 (World Bank 2008).
Spillovers are possible through trade, depending on the absorptive
capacity of the country. Absorptive capacity describes the recipient
country’s ability to do research to understand, implement, and adapt
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technologies arriving in the country. Absorptive capacity influences
the speed at which a newly arriving technology diffuses through a
developing country. It depends on the technological literacy and skills of
the workforce, and is influenced by education, the strength of governing
institutions, and financial markets (see World Bank 2008 for a discussion
of the role of absorptive capacity in technology transfer).
Foreign Direct Investment. Using foreign direct investment (FDI), a
multinational corporation (MNC) establishes a subsidiary in the recipient
country and makes use of advanced technology in the subsidiary. FDI
flows into developing countries rose from $10 billion in 1980 to $390
billion in 2007 (World Bank 2008).
The beneficiary of technology transfer through FDI varies. In some
cases, the MNC may reap the rewards of using the new technology (e.g.,
via enhanced productivity and greater profits). In other cases, local firms
may learn about the technology (e.g., through workers who leave the
MNC to work at a locally-owned company). In such cases, spillovers
occur and the developing country’s technological base is enhanced.
However, empirical studies on FDI in developing countries find little
evidence of technological spillovers from FDI (Saggi 2000, Keller
2004). Once again, absorptive capacity is important, as spillovers are
most likely when the difference in technological sophistication between
countries is not large (World Bank 2008).
License to a Local Firm. A multinational firm may instead choose to
license its technology to a firm in the recipient country. Developing
countries paid $22 billion in licensing fees in 2006, which, as a
percentage of developing country GDP, represents a five-fold increase
between 1999 and 2006 (World Bank 2006). Licensing allows the MNC
to avoid potential trade barriers when sending technology abroad, and to
gain entry to countries where they are uncertain about local markets or
customs. However, depending on the terms of the licensing agreement,
the MNC may give up some control over the technology. The strength
of intellectual property rights is important here, as stronger intellectual
property rights make it easier for the MNC to protect its technology and
thus more willing to license it. At the same time, stronger intellectual
property rights make spillovers to developing countries less likely.
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Because firms become less concerned with technology leaking out as an
innovation becomes older, firms tend to choose FDI to transfer newer
technologies and licensing to transfer older technologies that are no
longer cutting edge (Mansfield and Romeo 1980).
Incentives to Transfer Climate-Friendly Technology
Given these pathways for technology transfer, it is important to consider
the incentives that exist for adopting climate-friendly technology.
These depend on the nature of the technology and the extent to which
environmental externalities are corrected by environmental policy.
•• Energy efficient innovations diffuse even without environmental
policy.
First, consider emissions reductions achieved using energy efficient
technologies. Private firms have incentives to make such investments
even without climate policy in place, as reducing energy consumption
provides cost savings to the firm. For example, Fisher-Vanden et al.
(2006) studied energy consumption at 22,000 Chinese large and medium
enterprises, and found that total energy use fell by 17 percent between
1997 and 1999. About half of this decline can be explained by price
changes. Technological change, measured by firm-level R&D, accounted
for 17 percent of this change, and changes in ownership accounted for
another 12 percent.
They also found that a firm’s in-house technological activities are
important for creating absorptive capacity needed for successful
diffusion of imported technology. That is, local firms are more likely
to successfully transfer technology from abroad if they are actively
involved in R&D themselves. Similarly, Fisher-Vanden (2003) studied
the diffusion of continuous casting technology for steel production at 75
Chinese steel firms. The use of continuous casting has important energy
implications, as it uses 70 percent less energy than ingot casting. FisherVanden found that while centrally managed firms are the first to acquire
new technology, locally managed firms complete the integration of the
technology throughout the firm more rapidly.
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As both these studies illustrate, energy efficient technologies will
diffuse to developing countries even without the aid of policy, as firms
(particularly privately owned, profit maximizing firms) look to lower
production costs. Since 1980, energy intensity, defined as energy
consumption per dollar of GDP, has fallen at a rate of nearly 4 percent
per year in China. Worldwide, energy intensity has fallen at a rate of
1.5 percent per year since 1995 (Energy Information Administration
n.d.). However, without policies limiting carbon emissions, firms
will underinvest in energy efficient technologies, as the additional
environmental benefits achieved by these technologies do not enhance
the firm’s bottom line.
•• Without environmental policy, firms do not have incentives to
adopt costly technologies that reduce emissions but provide no
additional cost savings to the firm.
In other cases, reducing emissions requires firms to take costly actions
that provide no direct benefits to the firm itself. Examples of such
technologies for climate change include clean energy sources such as
wind and solar, which produce no carbon emissions but cost more than
fossil-fuel based energy sources; capture of methane gas from landfills;
and carbon sequestration from power plants.
Because most policies reducing carbon emissions are only a few years
old, little evidence of the effect of these polices on technology diffusion
exists. Instead, we can draw analogies from the study of older air
pollution technologies. For instance, since regulations limiting particulate
matter (PM) were enacted several years before regulations covering
sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX), most power plants in
China have controls for particulate matter, while only the newest plants
control NOX and SO2 (Lovely and Popp 2008). Similarly, Gallagher
studies joint ventures between US and Chinese automobile firms.
All of them transfer environmental technology to China, but it is not
advanced. In most cases, emissions control technologies used in autos
in China comply with older Euro II standards, which are required for
Beijing and Shanghai, but would not meet developed country standards.
Gallagher notes that “(t)he main reason cleaner and more energy-efficient
technologies were not transferred is that there simply were no compelling
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policy incentives for the US firms to do so, and the foreign firms did not
voluntarily transfer better technologies” (2006, p. 387).
Because most pollution control technologies are first developed in
industrialized countries, and because environmental regulations are
needed to provide incentives to adopt these technologies, adoption
of regulation is a key first step in the diffusion of climate-friendly
technologies. While the adoption of pollution control technologies within
a country responds quickly to environmental regulation, adoption of the
regulations themselves follows the typical S-shaped pattern noted in
studies of technology diffusion, in which a few early adopters, typically
technology leaders, are followed by a period of more rapid adoption. A
period of slower adoption by the remaining stragglers follows.
•• As pollution control technologies improve, the costs of abatement,
and thus the costs of adopting environmental regulation, fall. Over
time, countries adopt environmental regulation at lower levels of per
capita income.
Lovely and Popp (2008) studied the adoption of regulations limiting
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides at coal-fired electric
power plants in 39 countries, both developed and developing,
concentrating on the period 1980 to 2000, focusing on access to
technology as an important factor influencing regulatory adoption. As
pollution control technologies improve, the costs of abatement, and
thus the costs of adopting environmental regulation, fall. As a result,
over time, countries adopt environmental regulation at lower levels
of per capita income. Figure 1 illustrates this trend for the adoption of
SO2 emission regulations. The figure shows per capita GDP, measured
in 1995 US dollars, in the year of adoption of SO2 regulations for each
of the 39 countries included in their study. Along the horizontal axis,
countries are sorted by the year in which they adopted. The figure is
divided into three segments. The first segment includes 6 countries that
adopted before 1980, the first year of data in their analysis. With the
exception of the Philippines, each of these countries adopted at a per
capita income roughly between $15,000 and $20,000. Early adoption of
regulation in the Philippines is explained by close bilateral relations with
the United States, which includes aid for environmental protection.
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Of the countries adopting SO2 regulations between 1980-2000, there
is a strong trend of countries adopting at lower incomes over time.
Lovely and Popp interpreted this trend as showing how the availability
of technologies, produced by countries that first chose to adopt SO2
regulations, lowered adoption costs sufficiently for more countries to be
able to afford reducing SO2 emissions. Moreover, they found countries
that are more open to international trade gain access to new abatement
technologies sooner, and thus are able to regulate SO2 emissions sooner.
Finally, the third segment of Figure 1 includes countries that have yet
to adopt SO2 regulations. Except for Australia and New Zealand, which
choose to not regulate SO2 emissions because the coal found in these
countries is generally low in sulfur, these are all low-income countries
(Soud 1991, McConville 1997).
Hilton (2001) also found that late adopters of regulation can learn from
early adopters. Using data on 48 nations, he looked at the time it took
each country to eliminate lead from fuel, measuring from the date that
each country first began phasing out lead in fuel to the date on which the
country achieved lead levels at or below 0.5 grams of lead per gallon.
Countries that began the process after 1979 completed the lead phaseout five years faster, on average, than those beginning before 1979.
Even among countries that did not completely phase out lead, those that
began the phase-out process earlier achieved greater reductions. Hilton
concluded that late adopters are able to move more quickly because they
benefit from lessons learned by early adopters.
Both these studies suggest that advances in technology within developed
countries can shorten the time by which developing countries agree to
binding emissions reductions. When considering environmental policy,
countries weigh the benefits of a cleaner environment against the costs of
complying with the regulation. Technological advances lower the cost of
compliance, making regulation more likely.
Applications to Climate Change
Politicians continue to express concerns over non-participation of
developing countries, but this is no different from the path taken for other
environmental regulations. Developed countries have traditionally acted
first, after which the resulting technological innovations made it easier
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for developing countries to adopt regulations at a later date. There is no
reason to expect climate policy to be any different.
However, climate policy is complicated by the fact that GHG emissions
reductions are a public good—they benefit everyone, not just the local
citizenry. Given this, it is less likely that developing countries will move
as quickly to regulate CO2 emissions as they did in the cases of SO2,
NOX, and lead. Moreover, developing countries are more likely to accept
moderate emissions reductions that could be met by improved efficiency
(such as China’s climate strategy discussed in the introduction), as the
adoption of energy efficiency technologies provides secondary benefits to
these countries.
Technological change can also help alleviate the problem of incomplete
participation in climate treaties. The standard presumption is that when
only some countries commit to reducing carbon emissions, high-carbon
industries will migrate to non-participating countries, resulting in carbon
leakage, an increase in CO2 emissions in the non-participating countries
in reaction to the reduction in emissions by the more strictly regulated
countries. Golombek and Hoel (2004) noted that, in the countries
committed to carbon reductions, induced technological change will lower
abatement costs, which may be sufficient to encourage non-participating
countries to reduce their carbon emissions as well. Golombek and Hoel
also found the level of environmental R&D in the non-participating
country to be important. If the non-participating country is already
performing environmental R&D, increases in environmental R&D in
the participating country may crowd out R&D in the non-participating
country, mitigating the benefits of spillovers. However, if the nonparticipating country was not doing environmental R&D, as is the case in
most developing countries, spillovers will lead to lower emissions. This
work is theoretical in nature, and suggests directions for future research.
In particular, estimating the magnitude of each effect (technology transfer
vs. leakage) would help policymakers better understand the risks (or lack
thereof) of incomplete participation.
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The Clean Development Mechanism and Technology
Transfer
As the previous discussion shows, the transfer of clean technologies
to developing countries is important if the growth of carbon emissions
from these countries is to be contained. However, with the exception of
some energy efficiency technologies, clean technologies typically do
not flow across borders unless environmental policies in the recipient
country provide incentives to adopt clean technology. Given the need for
continued economic development, developing countries are unlikely to
enact policies requiring binding emissions reductions at this time.
Instead, incentives for these technology flows come from the Clean
Development Mechanism, which allows developed countries to
meet their own emissions reduction limits by sponsoring projects
in developing countries. This section draws on our discussion of
international diffusion of environmental technologies to consider the
implications of this research for the design and impact of policies such as
the CDM.
CDM provides the regulatory incentive to undertake emissions reducing
activities in developing countries that do not provide the user with
private costs savings, such as lower energy costs. Capturing landfill gas
is an example of an emissions mitigation project that would not occur
without regulation. CDM also increases the profitability of investing in
projects with some private gain, such as improving energy efficiency.
Without CDM, firms can reap the benefits of lower energy costs from
such investments, but they are not rewarded for the environmental
benefits of reduced carbon emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol states two purposes for the CDM: to help developed
countries meet emissions reductions obligations and to help developing
countries achieve sustainable development (Kyoto Protocol, Article 12.2,
1997). We discuss the role technology transfer plays for each of these
goals below.
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Does CDM Produce Real Emissions Reductions?
For CDM to achieve real emissions reductions, CDM projects must
achieve reductions that could not have occurred without the project
taking place. Approved projects should meet three criteria, according to
Article 12.5 of the Kyoto Protocol.
1. Participation should be voluntary, and be approved by each party
involved.
2. The project should deliver “real, measurable, and long-term benefits
related to the mitigation of climate change.”
3. Reductions must be “additional to any that would occur in the
absence of the certified project activity.”
This last criterion, known as additionality, has received the bulk of
attention from analysts (see Gupta et al. 2007). Less attention has been
paid to the prospect of long-term benefits. However, the two concepts are
related.
For a project to be registered (and therefore approved) by the CDM
Executive Board, the applicant must establish additionality of the
emissions reductions. Typically, concerns about additionality focus on
current costs and benefits. The UNFCCC (2008) has approved several
methodological frameworks for assessing the additionality of proposed
CDM projects (http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/
approved.html). The basic methodology includes four steps:
1. Identify alternative scenarios: What other options are available to
project participants? Do these alternatives comply with local regulations?
2. Barrier analysis: Are there barriers to implementing the alternative
scenarios? If so, they are not viable alternatives. Are there barriers
to completing the proposed CDM project that the project design
overcomes?
3. Investment analysis: Is the baseline scenario a better financial
investment than the proposed CDM project?
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4. Common practice analysis: Is the proposed project currently common
practice in the area? If so, the emissions reductions are not additional.
To see the link between additionality and long-term benefits, note that
CDM project credits extend for several years. Registered projects have
a lifespan of 7 or 10 years. According to the CDM Pipeline of approved
and potential CDM projects (http://cd4cdm.org/), as of April 2008,
496 of the 978 registered projects had a project length of 10 years,
and 481 had a project length of 7 years. (In addition, one reforestation
project in China has a project length of 30 years.) As discussed above,
environmental technologies have been diffusing to developing countries
even without the aid of the Clean Development Mechanism. Given
that diffusion is a gradual process, and that CDM credits are valid for
multiple years, it is important to ask not only whether a proposed CDM
project would be feasible today if credits were not available, but also
whether the proposed project would be feasible during later years of the
credit’s lifetime. Carbon emissions are cumulative—that is, they persist
in the atmosphere for hundreds of years. If the project would not be
viable today, but would be viable in three years time, the CDM credit is
not truly reducing global carbon concentrations, but is simply hastening
the reduction of emissions by three years. At most, it is only these three
years of reduction that are truly additional.
How Might Considerations of Long-Term Benefits Affect Additionality?

First, when determining baseline emissions, the UNFCCC considers
continuing the current practice, and then adopting the proposed
technology at a later date. However, no guidelines are provided for
determining what might be adopted at a later date. The lessons from
studies of earlier technological diffusion provide a useful guideline.
In the case of energy efficiency improvements, private actors have
incentives to adopt technology even without additional regulatory
pressure, so as to lower energy bills. Energy savings are more valuable
when energy prices are higher. In this vein, projects that claim credit
for improving energy efficiency should be viewed skeptically in a time
of rising energy prices. Even if such projects are not currently common
practice, one would expect these technologies to diffuse with or without
the aid of a CDM project. For example, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2006)
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found that, from 1997-1999, both imported and locally developed
technologies in China improved energy efficiency.
Some wind power projects may also be viable without CDM support.
The general manager of one wind project in China reports that
“(w)ithout the Clean Development Mechanism, we’d still be
profitable…. (But, we) need the C.D.M. for further expansion” (Bradsher
2007). This is particularly true in areas where the large infrastructure of
a traditional fossil-fueled power plant may not be feasible. In contrast,
projects without private benefits, such as the capturing of landfill gasses,
would be unlikely to occur without CDM support.
Second, consider the criterion of common practice. What is common
practice for multinational firms may not be common practice for local
firms. Looking at variations in FDI and environmental regulations
across Chinese provinces, Dean et al. (2008) found that FDI investment
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan is attracted to provinces with
weaker environmental regulation, while FDI from OECD nations is
not attracted. Technological differences are important here—OECD
multinationals use cleaner technologies elsewhere, and do not necessarily
choose to modify their production processes to pollute more when
investing abroad. Multinationals are usually the first to bring new
environmental technologies to a country (see, for example, Dasgupta et
al. 2002). In many cases, it is easier for a multinational firm to use the
same equipment and processes that it uses at home, rather than develop
a dirtier process for use in developing countries. Thus, the proper
evaluation for a CDM project located at a multinational corporation
(MNC) subsidiary should ask whether it is common practice for the
MNC, rather than whether it is common practice in the host country.
Can CDM Help Developing Countries Achieve Sustainable
Development?
By transferring technology to the host country, the Clean Development
Mechanism can help lower a developing country’s costs of eventual
compliance with global climate treaties, and increase the likelihood
that developing countries will agree to binding emissions reductions
at a later date. While language in the Kyoto Protocol encourages the
transfer of climate-friendly technologies, the Clean Development
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Mechanism was not explicitly designed with technology transfer in mind.
Nonetheless, the potential for technology transfer is an important part
of any evaluation of the CDM, particularly when evaluating the longterm benefits that may accrue. Projects that lead to knowledge spillovers
through disembodied technology transfer reduce the future costs of
lowering emissions. Thus, an important question for evaluating the CDM
is whether it encourages projects that include a transfer of knowledge, as
opposed to simply a transfer of equipment. Interestingly, the importance
of knowledge spillovers is overlooked in many analyses of CDM’s
impact on sustainable development. Instead, the focus is on broader goals
such as poverty reduction, increased employment, and improvement of
local environmental conditions (see, for example, Sutter and Parreño,
2007).
Related to technology transfer is a concern often raised by critics of
CDM—the problem of “low-hanging fruit” and diminishing returns
(e.g., Narain and van’t Velt 2008, note 1). Consider the example of
trying to reduce energy consumption in your own home. The first steps
you can take are straightforward and virtually costless—turning off
lights when not in use, lowering the thermostat, and installing compact
fluorescent light bulbs. Further reductions in energy consumption,
such as replacing older appliances with newer energy efficient models
and adding more insulation, would cost much more. Similarly, when
considering emissions reductions in a country, the easiest, least expensive
projects will probably be done first. To the extent that CDM projects do
not involve technology transfer, but rather a developed country investor
acting unilaterally, the low cost options will be used first, making future
emissions reductions more costly. The recipient developing countries will
be worse off when they try to reduce emissions on their own, and less
willing to agree to binding emissions reductions at a later date.
However, technological change can counteract the impact of diminishing
returns. While the costs of additional emissions reductions at a given
time increase as more projects are completed, the arrival of new
technologies may reduce the future cost of reducing emissions. As noted
earlier, the advancement of climate policies in developed countries
can be expected to further lower these costs, even without emissions
reduction commitments from developing countries. As these technologies
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become available in developing countries, the costs of emissions
reductions will fall, at least partially offsetting the low-hanging fruit
problem. For CDM to contribute to these falling costs, it is important that
projects (a) include a component of technology transfer, and (b) that this
transfer include disembodied knowledge, so that the benefits spill over
into the economy as a whole. Designing CDM policy to encourage such
transfers reduces the likelihood that the low-hanging fruit problem will
arise.
Encouraging Technology Transfer within CDM
CDM is an important source of aid to developing countries, providing
more resources than the Global Environmental Facility. However, CDM
investments are small compared to private flows of FDI (Gupta et al.
2007, referencing Ellis et al. 2007). Most CDM projects have taken place
in China.
In the early years of CDM trading, reducing trifluoromethane (HFC-23)
emissions dominated CDM projects. HFC-23 is a powerful greenhouse
gas with a global warming potential (GWP) equivalent to 11,700 tons of
CO2. HFC-23 is cheap to eliminate, and its use is already prohibited in
developed countries as a result of the Montreal Protocol (The Economist
2007). Even in developing countries, many of these HFC-23 reductions
are likely to have occurred even without the aid of developed countries.
The cost of eliminating HFC-23 is so low that firms producing the gas
make more money from selling CDM credits than they do by selling
the gas themselves (Wara 2007). To avoid the possibility of new firms
entering the HFC-23 market simply to sell CDM credits, the United
Nations no longer allows CDM credits to be sold to new HFC-23
producers (The Economist 2008).
Projects to eliminate HFC-23 are an example of equipment transfers that
may eliminate low-hanging fruit, but do not enhance the technical ability
of the recipient country. As opportunities for further HFC-23 reductions
are few, the focus of CDM reductions changed in 2007 to clean energy
projects, such as renewable energy, fuel switching, and energy efficiency
(Capoor and Ambrosi 2008), where the potential for transfer of
knowledge exists, depending on how the project is set up.
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While the CDM language in the Kyoto Protocol does not require
technology transfer, individual host countries can take action to
encourage technology transfer. CDM projects must be approved by
the host country’s government. Some countries choose to evaluate the
technology transfer potential of projects when considering approval.
For example, South Korea requires that “environmentally sound
technologies and know-how shall be transferred” by CDM projects in
Korea (Lee 2006, quoted in Haites et al. 2006). As a result, 88 percent of
the emissions reductions from CDM projects in South Korea come from
projects that involve technology transfer. Similarly, Chinese guidelines
for CDM project approval state that “CDM project activities should
promote the transfer of environmentally sound technology to China”
(China 2005, quoted in Haites et al. 2006). While this is not mandatory,
75 percent of CDM emissions reductions in China come from projects
that transfer technology.
In contrast, the percentage of reductions coming from projects with
technology transfer is lower in countries that do not specifically consider
technology transfer when approving CDM projects, such as Brazil or
India (Haites et al. 2006).
How might policy encourage CDM projects with a technology transfer
component? Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008) looked at 644 CDM projects
registered by the Executive Board of the UNFCCC to determine how
many projects transferred “hardware,” such as equipment or machinery,
as opposed to “software,” that is, knowledge, skills, or know-how. In
other words, how often did these CDM projects transfer knowledge and
skills that not only allow a developed country investor to meet emissions
reduction credits, but also enable the recipient developing country to
make continual improvements to their own emission levels?
Dechezleprêtre et al. found that 43 percent of the projects (279), involve
technology transfer. However, these projects are among the most
significant CDM projects, as they account for 84% of the expected
emissions reductions from registered CDM projects. Of these, 57
transferred equipment, 101 transferred knowledge, and 121 transferred
both equipment and knowledge. The percentage of projects involving
technology transfer varied depending on the type of technology used
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in the project. For instance, all projects reducing HFC-23 involved
solely a transfer of equipment. Most projects reducing nitrous oxide and
recovering methane also involved equipment transfer, as did renewable
energy projects such as wind and solar. In contrast, energy efficiency
measures were less likely to include technology transfer, offering
another reason for viewing CDM projects promoting energy efficiency
skeptically. Technology transfer also varied by recipient country. Just
12 percent of the projects studied in India included technology transfer,
compared to 40 percent in Brazil and 59 percent in China.
The authors found that a project is more likely to include technology
transfer if it is larger, if the project developer is a subsidiary of a
company in a developed country, and if the project includes one or
more carbon credit buyers. Before credits for a project can be sold, the
emission reductions must be certified. Because they have an interest in
obtaining emission credits, credit buyers help to facilitate this process.
Similar to Lovely and Popp (2008), they also found that trade policy is
important. Technology transfer is more likely if the country is more open
to trade.
The technological capacity of a country also enhances technology
transfer, as it makes the recipient better able to absorb new knowledge.
This result is sector specific, however, and is only important in the
energy and chemical industries. Interestingly, in the case of agriculture,
technological capacity reduces the likelihood of technology transfer.
Much R&D activity in developing countries focuses on agriculture.
As such, countries with greater technological capacity are better able
to develop their own innovations in agriculture, reducing the need for
technology transfer from abroad.
Technology transfer is less likely if there are other similar projects in the
country. These results suggest that the needs of the host country should
be considered when certifying (or choosing not to certify) CDM projects.
They also suggest that more general policies designed to improve
absorptive capacity in a country enhance the prospects for technology
transfer. Offering assistance in the development of absorptive capacity,
such as training for environmental engineers in developing countries,
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could be a useful bargaining chip for developed countries in the next
round of climate negotiations.

Conclusions
As the economies of developing countries grow, greenhouse gas
emissions from these countries will continue to rise. Curtailing growth
in these countries is not a viable alternative. The diffusion of clean
technologies will play a vital part in any climate stabilization strategy.
This study reviews the literature on transfer of environmentally-friendly
technologies and discusses how the lessons from this research can inform
climate policy.
A key point is that technology diffusion is gradual. The process of
diffusion of climate friendly technologies and policies in developing
countries is no different from what has already occurred with other
environmental policies, such as for sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and
leaded gasoline. Early adoption of policy by developed countries leads to
the development of new technologies that make it easier for developing
countries to reduce pollution as well. Some technologies, such as those
that enhance energy efficiency, will diffuse to developing countries
even without the aid of policy prescriptions such as the CDM. This is
important for assessing the potential emissions reductions of proposed
CDM projects.
While often frowned upon by environmental advocates, globalization,
that is, the opening up of economies to international competition, plays
an important role in moving clean technologies to developing countries.
Clean technologies are first developed in the world’s leading economies,
and developing countries gain access to them through international trade
and foreign investments. These countries then adopt environmental
regulations more quickly than they otherwise would.
Finally, the absorptive capacity of nations is important. The technological
skills of the local workforce enable a country to learn from, and build
upon, technologies brought in from abroad.
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Design and Implementation of Future CDM Projects
•• Better understanding of the rates of diffusion
The gradual, dynamic nature of diffusion also has important implications
for the design and implementation of future CDM projects. We cannot
predict which countries would still gain access to which technologies
without CDM projects. We need to develop evidence and methodologies
to predict whether a proposed technology would be likely to diffuse to
a country during the life of a CDM project, even if the project did not
take place. A recent World Bank report (2008) finds evidence that newer
technologies are moving to developing countries at faster rates than
in the past. However, there is little evidence on the speed of diffusion
of climate-friendly technologies. As knowing the speed of diffusion is
important for policy implementation, such studies are a promising topic
for future research. Such a research agenda could focus on global rates
of diffusion, as well as the behavior of multinational corporations in
other developing countries. Intuitively, the key is to be able to determine
whether the technology proposed in a CDM project application is about
to diffuse to the country anyway—for example, is it already appearing in
countries that are similar but only slightly more advanced? Such criteria
would help ensure that CDM projects not only assist developed countries
in meeting emission reduction requirements, but also aid developing
countries through knowledge spillovers from technology transfer.
•• Designing CDM to encourage knowledge spillovers.
Finally, as the world prepares for a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, an
important question is whether CDM can be enhanced more generally
to encourage technology transfer. The current CDM addresses the
environmental externality market failure by providing investors with an
opportunity to profit from climate-friendly investments in developing
countries. However, CDM does not address market failures resulting
from the public goods nature of knowledge (see, for example, Driesen
2008). Increased attention to the long-term development implications
of CDM technology transfer would be consistent with the sustainable
development goals of CDM.
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Encouraging such spillovers will be challenging. Policymakers could
simply choose to withhold approval for CDM projects that do not result
in knowledge spillovers. However, doing so without compensating
firms for these spillovers would lower the interest of developed country
investors in CDM projects. While projects unlikely to contribute
knowledge spillovers would be reduced, there is no guarantee that such a
policy would actually increase projects with knowledge spillovers.
To increase the spillovers resulting from CDM projects, investors
would need to be compensated for the benefits these spillovers provide.
Traditional policies for encouraging R&D, such as intellectual property
rights, are not appropriate, as they work by preventing spillovers
rather than enhancing them. Instead, subsidies to CDM investors
would compensate them for the positive social benefits of knowledge
spillovers. Funding for such subsidies would most likely have to come
from developed countries. While developed countries may balk at such
aid, it would not only improve the development prospects of recipient
countries, but also the likelihood that these recipient countries will agree
to binding emissions reductions at a later date.

Appendix. Annex 1 Countries of the Kyoto Protocol
Country

Annex 1
●

OECD
●

1

Australia

2

Austria

●

3

Belarus

●

4

Belgium

●

5

Bulgaria

●

6

Canada

●

7

Croatia

●

8

Czech Republic

●

●

9

Denmark

●

●

10

Estonia

●

11

European Community

●

12

Finland

●
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●
●
●

●
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France

●

●

14

Germany

●

●

15

Greece

●

●

16

Hungary

●

●

17

Iceland

●

●

18

Ireland

●

●

19

Italy

●

●

20

Japan

●

●

21

Korea

22

Latvia

●

23

Lichtenstein

●

24

Lithuania

●

25

Luxembourg

●

26

Mexico

27

Monaco

●

28

Netherlands

●

●

29

New Zealand

●

●

30

Norway

●

●

31

Poland

●

●

32

Portugal

●

●

33

Romania

●

34

Russian Federation

●

35

Slovak Republic/Slovakia

●

36

Slovenia

●

37

Spain

●

●

38

Sweden

●

●

39

Switzerland

●

●

40

Turkey

●

●

41

Ukraine

●

42

United Kingdom

●

●

43

United States

●

●

13

●

●
●

●

Sources: www.OECD.org; unfccc.int (Kyoto Protocol).
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